women. All the authors accept as "received wisdom" the idea that the period they are dealing with was "regressive" for women compared with a period that had come before. Three Lewalski's version of the "regression" argument is problematic, because it assumes that the condition of women as a group can be inferred chiefly from a court-based ideology. Her too-brief discussion of this issue implies that a "culture dominated by a powerful Queen" (Elizabeth) was somehow more progressive for wuomen in general (but according to what criteria?) than a culture whose "court ethos" was "shaped by the patriarchal ideology and homosexuality of James I" (p. 2). Krontiris and a number of other recent feminist scholars do not subscribe to Lewalski's view that Elizabeth's reign provided a more congenial environment for English women in general than James's reign did. 3 In any case, the position of a historical drama in which women are not only oppressed but more oppressed than they had been in the past (or than they would be at some future point) is an important but I think also a problematic inaugural move in each of these books about Renaissance women who struggle against oppression and who are depicted as succeeding, to some degree, in making something valuable-and usually verbal-from adversity. In so doing, the Renaissance women studied in these books find solme measure of what each of these critics calls "autonomy." 4 Although that conceptual stress on autonomy brings certain problems, as I suggest in more detail later, it also brings some important challenges to "received wisdom" about the Renaissance period. One striking feature of these critics' approaches to Renaissance women is a sustained and productive attention to the cultural significance of women's religious beliefs, in all their variety, during the Renaissance era. Neither Burckhardt nor Kelly had much to say about women and religion-Kelly because like many left-wing feminists of the 1960s and 1970s she implicitly accepts a Marxist denigration of religion as an element of the "superstructure" and an instrument of ideological mystification; Burckhardt because his praise of the new Renaissance (elite male) "individuality" depends on attributing to the Renaissance mind a spirit of skeptical rationalism that dramatically contrasts with the kind of Christian belief he imputes to the "medieval mind." Humanism, which Burckhardt takes as the "advance guard" of Renaissance individualism, was in his view a fundamentally "pagan" and "worldly" intellectual movement.5 Burckhardt suggests, however, that this is a "construction" of the period which serves the nineteenth-century academic interpreter's needs; the humanists, he writes, "display as a rule such a character that even their religion, which is sometimes professed very definitely, becomes a matter of indifference to its" (p. 479, my emphasis).
Burckhardt's remark points to the need to ask what psychic or social needs are perhaps being served when religion becomes a matter of great importance to modern feninist students of the period, but there is no doubt that much of the new feminist scholarship on the early modern period usefully challenges earlier approaches-idealist and historical materialist both-that saw religion as epiphenomenonal or even antithetical to the real "Renaissance." Indeed, the books under review reinstate religion to suggest, provocatively, that if women did not have a Renaissance, they did at least have a Reformation. These critics further suggest that the two phenomena can no longer be treated as separate "moments" and/or as separate geographic locales (Italy as the home of the "Renaissance," Northern Europe as the home of the "Reformation") in standard history courses.
The implicit challenge both to Burckhardt's and Kelly's views of the importance of religion in our constructions of the so-called Renaissance also has interesting implications for the view, widely accepted in our school textbooks and in the advertising industry as well, that the Renaissance was an Age of Enlightenment to be contrasted to, and valued more positively than, a preceding "dark" age of dogmatic religious belief construed as somehow antithetical to "individuality." In WoHmlen of the Renaissance, for instance, the historian Margaret King sees the "heroines of the Renaissance" as the "female worshippers of God" who "aroused awe for their heroic asceticisln, their unstinting service, their other worldly visions, their inner power" (p. 129). And although her chapters focus mainly on women's secular writings, Krontiris frames her discussion by noting that "in the name of the word of God, women could and did claim their right to speak independently from men" (p. 10). Both in her introduction and in her chapters on such wonmen writers as Aemilia Lanyer and Elizabeth Cary, Lewalski astutely analyzes the ideologically "destabilizing" potential in Christian and especially Protestant doctrines that stress the believer's "iinlmediate relationship with God and primary responsibility to follow conscience in every action" (p. 8); and Hobby devotes two richly textured chapters, on women prophets and on women's religious poetry, meditations, and conversion narratives, respectively, to illustrating her argument that seventeenth-century English women used religion as a major justification for writing. Despite the "chastity, silence, and obedience" officially King defines the Renaissance broadly in both temporal and spatial terms. Her study surveys women's lives from 1350 through 1650 and takes its examples mainly from Italy, France, Germany, and England, with brief glances at saints fromn Spain (Teresa) and Sweden (Bridget). King organizes her book in three chapters. The first two examline women of various social classes in relation to two key institutions, the family and the church; the third, entitled "Women and High Culture," builds on King's own earlier work on "learned" women, creatures often regarded as belonging to a peculiar "third sex." 7 King's specific discussions of women's lives and religious beliefs effectively challenge a standard view of a new Renaissance "self-hood" emerging suddenly from an "unselfconscious" Middle Ages. That view appears not only in older Burckhardtian celebrations of the Renaissance but also in many recent New Historicist accounts that look with a critical eye on the (alleged) emergence of a "liberal humanist ideology"-with an accompanying new "subjectivity"-in the sixteenth century.8 Nonetheless, although King usefully complicates various theories that pit the Renaissance and its typical (elite male) modes of subjectivity against a "homogenized Age of Faith," she makes no effort to theorize her own views about periodization. I was often perplexed by her oscillations between stressing a fundamental continuity between medieval and Renaissance periods, on the one hand, and arguing, on the other, for the Renaissance as a period of "decline" for women (a view adapted from Kelly that requires some notion of-and explanation for-discontinuity between the periods). I also have questions about the way in which King valorizes religion as the prime, and sometimes the only, avenue through which both late medieval and Renaissance women could achieve "autonomy."
In the book's longest chapter, "Women and the Church," King argues that "from the thirteenth through the seventeenth centuries, women increasingly made their own way" despite the "ingrained anti-female bias" of the "official church"; through religion, women "'found their own space and boundaries of autonomy, however limited these were.' They explored new forms of aggregation for the purpose of living a holy life outside the framework of the monastic establishment. They thus created new opportunities for women to enjoy the same freedom of spiritual expression within a comnunal life as men had already claimed" (p. 103). And they did so against a pattern "of increased restriction of female piety and reclaustration of female communities" (p. 113). Here King seems to be arguing for an "increase" in women's spiritual autonomy as a correlate, of some kind, to a "pattern of increased restriction" on women dictated by a powerful institution. I wish King had dealt more clearly with the questions of causality lurking in this argument; and I would also like to know more about what it means to ascribe "autonomy" to women whose recorded words stress a notion of desirable female "selfhood" that differs in important ways from what modern liberal feminists usually mean by autonomy. One of King's most fascinating examples of a woman who resisted the Church's authority is Marguerite Porete, who was burned at the stake around 1310 along with copies of her heretical book. But there is an intriguing gap, it seems to me, between King's use of Porete to illustrate women's struggle for autonomy "in the Renaissance centuries" (p. 117) and Porete's own desire for a mystical union with the divine in which the soul becomes "a blank" and so purified that "it seems that nothing exists except God himself' (quoted by King, p. 116, from a translation of Porete's The Mirror of Simple Souls). King herself comments that "the boundaries between self and God, in Porete's vision, are richly blurred"; and King also comments that Porete's notion of the "annihilation of the soul" in God was one of the ideas specifically condemned by the church officials. King does not, however, reflect on the blurring of historical difference-and the muting of political precisionthat occurs when a modern critic presents Porete's words (and martyrdom) under the narrative rubric of a quest for greater "autonomy" for women. Because that term wasn't even used to describe an individual's "freedom" until the early nineteenth century, feminist scholars of the early modern period need to put more critical pressure on this concept than most of us (and here I include myself) have done to date. The nature, degree, and effects of a critical identification with the objects (subjects) of one's inquiry are particularly vexing issues for the historians and literary scholars who study early modern women writers. Such women were-simply by virtue of their literacy-members of a tiny minority of the population, and it is risky to take their textual depictions of their experiences as representative of "female experience" in any general sense. Tina Krontiris's fascinating study of six Renaissance women writers making "room for self-expression" under adverse circumstances does tend at times to conflate "women" and "women writers."10 When Krontiris does this, and also when she suggests that the women writers she studies, unlike royal women, were "typical of other women at that point of English culture" (p. 24), she assumes too easily, I think, that women's gender, irrespective of other social differences including access to literacy, allows us to constitute them as a social group and as our object of analysis. Implicitly judging her Renaissance subjects by modern feminist standards, she seems to find their voices wanting in some desired quantity of opposition. What to make of a diminished thing? she seems (almost) to ask in her conclusion. And her readers may be left wondering what to make of a (Foucauldian) theory of resistance which looks custom-made for modern first-world academics (resistance is not, he says, "inexorably frustrated through being the compatriot of power") but which seems nonetheless-on the evidence of Krontiris's conclusion-not quite sufficient to the demands of the day (theirs or ours).
One response to such a line of inquiry-which I am stressing not because I have clear answers but rather because it seems important to pursue collectively-appears in the afterword to Barbara Lewalski's book. There, explaining her decision to avoid the term "feminist" to describe Jacobean women, she acknowledges a desire "to sidestep controversy as to what set of attitudes warrants that modern label" and, "more important, to focus attention on the stances possible at an earlier historical moment" (p. 314). Her first explanation effectively sidesteps any attempt to theorize the relation between present and past concerns in our scholarly work (the old but still important chestnut of the "hermeneutic circle"). The second explanation, which Lewalski feels is the more important one, raises for me the question of whether the literate and economically privileged women Lewalski and most literary feminist scholars perforce analyze (our preferred form of evidence being written words) really represent all the ideological stances possible in the Jacobean era? It seems politically problematic to define possibility on the basis of a historical record inherited through-and often constructed by-literate persons and elite institutions.
Lewalski does firmly state, in her introductory chapter, that the nine female subjects she has chosen to study-three royal women and six well- Lewalski devotes her formidable powers as a literary historian and critic to these particular women because they were "actively involved in cultural production in Jacobean England" and because their "lives and texts illuminate and contextualize one another, inviting the perceptions of common patterns" (p. 2). One of these patterns, which Lewalski somewhat surprisingly writes that she was "somewhat surprised to discover," is "the strong resistance mounted in all these women's texts to the patriarchal construct of women as chaste, silent, and obedient, and their overt rewriting of women's status and roles" (p. 2).16 Lewalski's book, which will be important for scholars of the English Renaissance whatever their methodological and ideological leanings, elegantly synthesizes what previous literary historians and, more recently, a number of feminist scholars have unearthed. The book also offers many original insights as it weaves a contextual net around the writings it examines, exploring historical links among these privileged women as well as some of their shared concerns. In so doing, however, the book neglects the substantial political and religious differences among the women it constructs, on the basis of their shared gender, as oppositional voices. The book's tendency to homogenize its Jacobean female subjects under the banner of "opposition" to "patriarchy" perhaps reflects some problems in Lewalski's stated polemical aim of reducing what she sees as a "balkanization" of modern literary studies or, more locally, the subfield of English Renaissance studies. In her view, the recent scholarship on Renaissance women writers is insufficiently appreciated both by "traditional scholars" and by "newer scholars of early modern culture in their analyses of class, race, gender, and power relations" (i.e., many male "New Historicists"). To remedy this neglect, Lewalski adopts a rhetoric of judicious moderation that seems implicitly directed toward an audience of academic men. And in truth, Lewalski's rhetorical stance concedes a great dealsonme feminists will feel it's the whole shop-to traditional belletristic managers. The three women writers studied in the final section of the book, who "claim the major genres" and express their visions in "complex literary terms," produce works of "considerable aesthetic interest," Lewalski remarks in her introduction (p. 6). She reiterates the point a few pages later ("Cary, Lanyer, and especially Wroth are writers of considerable merit," p. 10); and she returns almost uncannily to the same phrase in her afterword, which refers to the scholarly labors that will enable us "to assess and properly value . . . [the] often considerable aesthetic merit" of these Jacobean women's writings (p. 309). The adjective "considerable," expressing an apparently "moderate" judgment of achievement, seems to take much more than it gives; the rhetorical reservation points, I think, to the book's unwillingness to historicize, or examine the ideological dimensions of, such notions as "major" genres or "personal autonomy." The latter notion underpins the book's dominant narrative, which begins to look like a version of America's favorite Horatio Alger story, but this time for women.
Each chapter shows an oppressed (but articulate and educated) woman using her social and/or verbal skills to allow the "emergence of a female self able to resist existing social norms and to struggle for . . . The basic narrative her book traces, and indeed her decision to study women's writing during the Revolution and its aftermath-seen by royalists as the "restoration" but by radicals as a "reactionary regime"-show that she is consciously exploring parallels between women's problems in twentieth-and seventeenth-century British society. After a period of radical experimentation that involves significant gains for "women's autonomy," a repressive regime forces women back into sexually subordinate and "private" or "domestic" roles. The 1650s are implicitly allied to the 1960s, in Hobby's account, and the "Restoration" era to Thatcher's regime in general and, in particular, to a development in the British women's movement that Hobby finds particularly troubling. This is the tendency toward "essentialist" feminism, toward seeing men as inherently violent, women as inherently peace loving and nurturing. Such an ideological position was widespread among feminist peace activists in the England of the 1980s, and Hobby sees disturbing parallels between that essentialist view and the "retreat into virtue"-the resigned acceptance of "traditional" female roles-she finds in many texts by women written after 1660.
Hobby's book surveys a quite astonishing range of materials by both female and male writers who treat the culturally contested issue of the relations between the sexes and the roles "proper" to each of them. Beginning with a chapter on women's prophecies (she notes that over one-half of the texts published by women in this period were prophecies-and of-ten, especially in the revolutionary years, overtly political ones), Hobby analyzes women's religious writings, their autobiographies and biographies of husbands, their "skills books" (on housewifery, medicine, and midwifery), and their education. In addition, there are three central chapters on "romantic love" as that phenomenon was represented in prose fiction, plays, and poetry, respectively. The book is a valuable survey but it is also a sustained argument that I found sometimes persuasive and sometimes reductive. Hobby summarizes the general argument at the beginning of her chapter on romantic love in prose fiction. The phrases "map out" and "shown to be" highlight the problem. Is Behn depicting "the facts," or is she constraining her women readers' "choices"-or, more likely, is she doing some complex mixture of the two, seeking to negotiate her own living by making a "virtue" of what is seen (by some) to be a necessity? Hobby tackles many rhetorically and politically difficult issues in her book, and I am persuaded by many of the specific arguments she advances (on the feminist dimensions of women's prophecies, for instance) in support of her underlying thesis about the Restoration's repressive effects on women and, correlatively but not identically, on ideologies of gender. I am not persuaded, however, that Hobby's reliance on an ahistorical notion of woman's quest for "autonomy" proves adequate-at the end of the day-to the complexity of her material or to the questions she wants to ask of it. Unlike Frost's ovenbird, she is not asking her questions about a process of "diminishment" in "all but words"; but some of the words that organize her inquiry, especially "autonomy," seem too ideologically freighted and blunt to do justice to the problems at stake in her book. If ideology involves making what is socially constructed seem ob-vious or natural, then autonomy is a notion overdue for a demystifying wash. The search for autonomy, on the part of modern American critics of the Renaissance, begins to look disturbingly similar to Burckhardt's idealist search for a peculiar Renaissance quality of self-conscious individuality.
Believing, as Joan Kelly did, that students of past societies "only come up with answers to questions we think to ask" (p. 204), Hobby ends her book with some questions she now thinks she should have asked but didn't-questions, for instance, about "race." Her questions about the lacunae and distortions in her own work seem prescient from the perspective of the 1990s, when changes in the demography of the North American and British academies, among other factors, are enabling innovative research into "race" in the Renaissance.18 Hobby doesn't push her discussion of "race" toward as broad a geographical reconception of her topic as it now seems to invite, in the wake of recent scholarly studies of Europe's imperial ventures; if we extend our notions of what counts as "literacy" (and "major genres"), we may hear from more Renaissance women-and men of color in "feminized subject positions"-than we might have dreamed we could a few years ago. Nonetheless, the kind of question Hobby asks-and the courage she displays in entitling her conclusion "Beginning Again"-make her intellectual example an appropriate place to finish this review. For the questions Hobby asks of her own research are precisely the kind of questions I think feminists in my field, and perhaps in others, should be trying to pose in critical terms honed by debate and fired by our different interpretations of how recent historical events impinge on our research agendas. From the vantage point of 1994, I can see fairly clearly that the emphasis on individual women's "autonomy"-defined mainly as an issue of voice and thought in the books under review-is in part a reaction to a sense of despair about the possibilities of collective feminist action under the conservative economic and political policies of the 1980s in both Britain and the United States. The "moderate" and basically liberal critical perspective I have been tracing here does seem to me in need of ideological critique, despite the valuable research that accompanies it. When, however, these critics themselves signal some uneasiness or discontent with their own critical formulations, or with their Renaissance "subjects," the moments are worth probing. In them, we can perhaps best glimpse potentially powerful counterarguments to my analogy between despairing feminist critics and Frost's ovenbird. He sang in sad acknowledgment of a diminution that he-and Frost-see as natural, inevitable. We who have words need not accept him as a model.
